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This paper develops an English School (ES) framework for analysing the 
emergence of new primary institutions in global international society (GIS), 
and applies this to the case of environmental stewardship. The paper traces 
the impact that global environmentalism has had on the normative order of 
GIS, examines the creation of secondary institutions around this norm and 
identifies the ways in which these developments have become embedded in 
the constitution and behaviour of states. It assesses the ways in which 
environmental stewardship has interacted with the other primary institutions 
that compose GIS, changing some of the understandings and practices 
associated with them. The conclusions argue that environmental stewardship 
is likely to be a durable institution of GIS, and that it might be a harbinger of a 
more functional turn in its priorities. 
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This paper develops an English School (ES) framework for investigating the 
impact that global environmentalism has had on the normative/constitutional 
order of global international society (GIS). The study of long-term and deep-
seated norm change is one of the hallmarks of the ES tradition (Buzan, 2004, 
2014; Clark, 2007; Holsti, 2004; Mayall, 1990; Reus-Smit, 1999; Wheeler, 
2000). Curiously, however, despite spawning a burgeoning literature in 
International Relations (IR) (Stevis, 2014), the rise of global environmental 
politics has not yet sparked comparable interest among ES scholars in 
understanding how a loose set of environmental ideas originating in the 19th 
century came to redefine international legitimacy and the moral purpose of the 
state in the late 20th century. We seek to correct this by applying ES theory to 
the field of global environmental politics and analysing environmental 
stewardship as a deep normative development in GIS, comparable to, and 
interacting with, the emergence and evolution of other primary institutions. For 
the ES, environmental stewardship offers a live contemporary case study of 
normative development and contestation in GIS to set alongside other more 
recent additions to the international constitutional order (nationalism, the 
market, human rights). It provides insights into the roles that both states and 
non-state actors (world society) play in bringing out normative change, and 
the interplay within GIS between primary and secondary institutions. It also 
adds to the insights gained from studying nationalism, human rights and the 
market, about how the emergence of a new primary institution has 
repercussions for other institutions within the constitutional structure of GIS.  
 We show how environmental stewardship evolved from a few scattered 
normative initiatives in the 19th century, through being a largely Western 
concern during much of the 20th, to becoming a globally accepted primary 
institution of GIS during the 21st. Over this period, global environmentalism 
gradually evolved into a distinctive set of global values that transcended their 
diverse local and national origins. World society actors turned 																																																								
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2017 Annual Convention of 
the International Studies Association. The authors thank the participants of the ISA 
panel as well as the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.  
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environmentalism into a transnational movement and pushed for its insertion 
into the normative order of international society. However, it was a state-
centric process of norm adoption and consolidation that morphed world 
society environmentalism into a primary institution of GIS. As expected in 
transnationalist and some ES literatures, world society actors thus played the 
key role as norm entrepreneurs, but state agency and leadership by great 
powers made it possible for environmentalism to change the criteria for 
international legitimacy in GIS. The strengthening of the environmental norm 
can be seen in the creation of a vast network of international environmental 
regimes and in state-level behavioural and constitutive changes. In this sense, 
secondary institutions serve as manifestations of the scope and strength of 
the underlying primary institution. At the same time, the limitations of, and 
struggles over, the regulatory power of secondary institutions also provide a 
measure of the depth of international norm change. While global 
environmentalism implies a strong solidarist development in global 
governance, environmental stewardship has made only limited progress on 
the path from a pluralist logic of international co-existence to a solidarist logic 
of cooperation. It has been successfully globalised, in part because it follows 
a universally accepted ‘common fate’ logic rather than a more exclusive 
Western liberal agenda, but its ability to transform the moral purpose of the 
state and GIS has been limited by continuing tensions with other primary 
institutions, most notably the market and national sovereignty.  
 The next section reviews the ES literature on environmental 
stewardship and develops an analytical framework for studying the 
emergence of new primary institutions. Section 3 traces the emergence of 
environmental stewardship as a norm of GIS, focusing on the interplay 
between states and non-state actors. Section 4 looks at the rise of 
environmental regimes and intergovernmental organizations (secondary 
institutions in ES terminology) as not only embodiments of this norm, and 
frameworks for rules and practices, but also as forums within which this norm 
is reproduced, developed and contested. Section 5 focuses on how states 
have embedded environmental stewardship into their structures, behaviours 
and identities. Section 6 looks at the interplay between environmental 
stewardship and other established primary institutions of GIS (sovereignty, 
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territoriality, great power management, market) as well as possibly emergent 
yet contested institutions (democracy, human rights). The conclusions 
consider the standing and strength/weakness of environmental stewardship 
as an institution of GIS, and how it stands in the ES’s pluralist-solidarist 
debates. 
 
The English School, global environmentalism and institutional change: 
an analytical framework  
 
The English School offers a distinctive perspective on global environmental 
politics that treats environmental protection not just as one of many 
international policy fields, but also as a site of deeper normative development 
in the society of states. ES theory shares with constructivism (Bernstein, 
2001) and discourse analysis (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006) a concern 
about how ideas such as environmental stewardship become norms that 
impact on the legitimacy of international order. Unlike neo-liberal 
institutionalism, the ES gives environmentalism a deeper, more structural, 
normative status. This section sets out an ES framework for identifying the 
emergence of a new primary institution. Subsequent sections apply this to the 
history of environmental stewardship in GIS.  
 While the ES played only a marginal role in the development of early IR 
scholarship on environmental issues (Stevis, 2014), its distinctive approach to 
the relationship between states and non-state actors, the purpose and 
legitimacy of sovereign statehood, and international institutional development 
in environmental politics, has come into sharper focus more recently. Early 
on, Bull (1977: 293-5) argued that a greater global environmental 
consciousness at the level of world society might best be constructed through 
initial measures of cooperation by states. Jackson (1996) both established the 
concept of environmental stewardship, and made the case that it was being 
addressed through the society of states. Like Bull, he was keen to counter the 
cosmopolitan arguments that the transnational character of environmental 
issues condemned the pluralist states-system to being part of the problem. 
Reus-Smit (1996) pushed further with the idea of a green moral purpose of 
the state. Linklater (Linklater, 2011; Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 218-9, 
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269) saw an emerging duty to prevent global environmental damage as part 
of cosmopolitan harm conventions. Hurrell, while noting the legitimacy crisis 
that sovereign states faced when confronted with global environmental 
change (1994), emphasised the role of states as part of both the problem and 
the solution, and charted the way in which environmental issues have pushed 
forward non-state actors in the process of global governance (2007: 216-36). 
Falkner (2012), Palmujoki (2013) and Buzan (2014) all suggest that there has 
been significant development of state-centric solidarism on this issue, where 
states themselves move away from a pluralist logic of coexistence towards a 
more solidarist logic of cooperation to deal with shared threats.  
 Jackson (2000: 177) separates environmental stewardship from human 
rights cosmopolitanism by attributing to it a distinct logic of ‘custodial 
responsibility for the planet’. This raises an issue familiar from debates about 
environmental security as to whether the referent object is the environment 
itself, or the capacity of the environment to sustain existing and desired levels 
of human civilization (Buzan, Wæver and deWilde, 1998: 75-6). If the 
environment itself is the referent object, then Jackson is correct. But if the 
environment is a means to the sustainability of human life and civilization, that 
opens a link between environmental stewardship and human rights, in which 
the right to a liveable environment is constructed as a human right. This has 
important implications for how environmentalism relates to other primary 
institutions of GIS.  
 ES authors have thus come to converge around the notion that the 
internationalisation of environmentalism represents a significant normative 
development in GIS. What remains unspecified, however, is the depth of the 
‘greening’ of GIS and its significance for other elements of the international 
normative order. We address this research gap by using the ES’s distinctions 
between primary and secondary institutions, and interstate and world society, 
to clarify exactly how far towards being a global primary institution 
environmental stewardship has come.  
 The distinction between primary and secondary institutions is 
foreshadowed in Bull’s work (1977: 53-7), and is implicit in Keohane’s (1988: 
285) distinction between ‘fundamental practices’ and international regimes. 
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Buzan (2014: 16-17), draws together ES thinking to define primary institutions 
as: 
 
…deep and relatively durable social practices in the sense of being 
evolved more than designed. These practices must not only be shared 
amongst the members of international society, but also be seen 
amongst them as legitimate behaviour. Primary institutions are thus 
about the shared identity of the members of international society. They 
are constitutive of both states and international society in that they 
define not only the basic character of states but also their patterns of 
legitimate behaviour in relation to each other, and the criteria for 
membership of international society.  
 
By contrast, secondary institutions are deliberately created institutions, 
whether regimes or intergovernmental organizations, which usually serve the 
purpose of regulating inter-state and sometimes also corporate relations in a 
specific issue-area (e.g. World Trade Organization; nuclear non-proliferation 
regime). A key function of secondary institutions is to reflect and reproduce 
the primary institutions that make up the international normative structure.2 
They both socialize states into the norms and practices of international 
society, and are sites of political contestation and conflict. Secondary 
institutions thus play important roles in the embedding, reproduction, 
development and sometime decay, of the primary institutions of GIS (Navari, 
2016). 
 Most IR scholarship on environmental issues has focused on 
secondary rather than primary institutions, in particular the creation and 
effectiveness of particular environmental regimes (Mitchell, 2003), questions 
of regime interplay (Oberthür and Gehring, 2006) and the coherence of what 
in many cases appears to be a fragmented cluster of institutions (Biermann et 
al., 2009). This analytical primacy of the regime perspective has obscured the 
question of environmentalism’s entrenchment in the normative structure of 
GIS and the consequences this has had for other primary institutions.  																																																								
2 See Spandler (2015) on the links between the ES approach to institutions and that 
in the institutionalist and constructivist literatures. 
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 While secondary institutions are comparatively easy to identify, it is 
much harder to establish a set of criteria for entry into the ranks of primary 
institutions (Buzan, 2004: 161-204). There are justified objections that the 
ES’s empirical approach to identifying primary institutions lacks rigour and is 
open to selection bias (Finnemore, 2001; Wilson, 2012). Functional logics 
offer ways of classifying primary institutions but cannot specify a definitive set, 
which leaves definition plus empirical observation as the best approach so far 
available. Primary institutions are therefore in the same boat as sectors in IR 
(Buzan, Wæver and deWilde, 1998) and function systems in Sociology 
(Stichweh, 2013: 58). In other words, there can be no fixed set of primary 
institutions (or sectors, or function systems) because they are emergent from 
the complex processes of human societies, which are endlessly inventive 
about the social forms and structures that they generate. Environmental 
stewardship thus emerged as a new social purpose within GIS in response to 
the destructive potential of the modern industrial system.  
 The historical process tracing of primary institutions has been applied 
most thoroughly by Mayall (1990) and Holsti (2004). Holsti (2004: 18-24) 
offers explicit criteria for identifying primary institutions: 
 
… institutions are the context within which the games of international 
politics are played. They represent patterned (typical) actions and 
interactions for states, the norms, rules and principles that guide (or fail 
to guide) them, and the major ideas and beliefs of a historical era…. 
International institutions contain the essential rules of coexistence 
between states and societies…. Institutions are the permissive 
contexts for many social transactions (Holsti, 2004: 18). 
 
The ES has for long used ‘the great society of humankind’ as a general moral 
referent by which to judge the degree and kind of order provided by the 
society of states (Buzan, 2004). More recently, Wheeler (2000); Clark (2007) 
and Pella (2013) have opened the door to ES thinking about world society as 
a more specific universe of non-state actors and movements that lobby 
interstate society in pursuit of normative claims ranging from anti-slavery, 
through human rights, to environmental stewardship. Buzan (2018) builds on 
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this work by proposing a distinction between two components of world society: 
normative world society, whose primary institution is collective identity, 
ranging from humankind as a whole to a wide variety of subglobal human 
identity groupings; and political world society, whose primary institution is 
advocacy, and comprises all the non-state social structures visible within 
humankind as a whole that have both significantly autonomous actor quality, 
and the capacity and interest to try to influence the normative structure of 
interstate society. Normative (interhuman) world society provides the 
ideational resources with which political (transnational) world society engages 
interstate society, and it can do this either on the basis of humankind as a 
whole, or subsets of humankind. Environmental stewardship is promoted by a 
whole range of advocacy non-state organizations that lobby interstate society 
to improve environmental protection in the name of humankind as a whole. 
When world society is viewed in this way, the ES framing can link smoothly to 
insights from the constructivist literature such as Keck and Sikkink (1998) on 
how ‘transnational advocacy networks’ reshape the normative environment of 
world politics, and Acharya (2009) on how ‘constitutive localization’ filters 
global normative pressures and adapts them to local circumstances and 
dispositions. 
 Our framework combines Holsti’s points with the ES’s distinctions 
between primary and secondary institutions, and interstate and world society. 
We identify two main criteria for determining whether environmental 
stewardship has become a primary institution. First, we expect to find a clearly 
defined value or principle applicable across international society (whether 
global or regional). We examine this in section 3 by tracing the emergence of 
the environmental idea, the interplay of this norm between interstate and 
world society, and the specific form that it has taken on as it moved centre-
stage in international diplomacy.  Second, we expect to observe a significant 
degree of social consolidation of environmentalism as a norm of GIS. There 
are two principal mechanisms through which this can happen: the creation of 
secondary institutions reflecting the underlying environmental norm (section 
4); and observable and significant patterns of behaviour by states in 
accordance with the core norm (section 5). This framework could be used to 
track the success and progress, or failure or decay, of any primary institution. 
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Whether, when and how environmental stewardship became a primary 
institution is our test case for this claim. 
 In addition, we are interested in using the ES’s distinction between 
pluralism and solidarism to understand the depth and the direction of 
environmentalism’s normative impact on GIS. The pluralism/solidarism debate 
defines the ES’s two main normative positions about what ‘ought’ to happen in 
international relations. It is centred on the question of how to balance the 
competing demands for advancing international order versus international 
justice, with order tending to privilege states, and justice tending to privilege 
more cosmopolitan, world society, approaches (Bain, 2014; Buzan, 2014; 
Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 59-68). Most of the ES debate has focused on 
the issue of human rights (Buzan, 2014: 83-4), but the pluralist/solidarist 
distinction can also be used to investigate the wider state of normative 
development in GIS. In this view, pluralism and solidarism denote two 
distinctive interaction logics in international relations and identify two states of 
what ‘is’, rather than ‘ought’. Primary institutions can be categorised as 
belonging to either a pluralist logic of coexistence (e.g. war, balance of power, 
great power management) or a solidarist logic of cooperation, or even 
convergence, around shared values (e.g. human rights, market, development) 
(Buzan, 2004). Using this perspective, we can detect changes in the nature of 
primary institutions from a pluralist to a solidarist logic or vice versa. Viewed in 
this way, the empirical study of environmental stewardship can yield insights 
into an ongoing shift towards solidarist approaches, be they state-centric 
forms of institutionalized cooperation, or transnational/cosmopolitan 
solidarism based on collective identity, cosmopolitan values and transnational 
forms of governance, or mixtures of these (Buzan, 2004: 114-20; Hurrell, 
2007: 224-28). Alternatively, we may find that global environmentalism is 
restricted to a more limited pluralist logic of securing the survival of societies 
and coexistence of states against the backdrop of existential ecological 
threats (Buzan, 2004: 233).  
 This ES analytical framework opens up an important perspective on the 
spatial reach of normative change. Even though the past two centuries have 
been a story of the continuous expansion of international society (Bull and 
Watson, 1984), for most of its history, Westphalian international society was 
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less than global in reach, and it is only since decolonization after the Second 
World War that the society of states can be said to have become universal 
(Reus-Smit and Dunne, 2017: 18). Even so, this GIS coexists with regional 
and subglobal international societies, and persisting differences in political 
and cultural values will continue to drive such regional differentiation 
(Acharya, 2009; Buzan, 2014, 180; Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018). At the 
level of primary institutions, we find that some are universally accepted and 
constitutive of GIS (sovereignty, nationalism, diplomacy), while others (human 
rights, democracy) are only valid in a sub-global or regional context. 
Normative development in international society thus proceeds not simply 
along the spectrum of pluralist coexistence to solidarist cooperation but also 
at different spatial scales. This historicization and spatialization of 
international society in ES theory becomes an important starting point for 
investigating the degree to which newly emerging norms such as 
environmentalism have become globalized or remain rooted either in a 
regional international society (e.g. Europe), or a wider but still subglobal one 
(e.g. the West).  
 
The Emergence of Environmental Stewardship as a Norm of 
International Society  
 
The emergence of environmental stewardship as a coherent set of purposive 
ideas and beliefs within GIS is a story involving both the interplay of interstate 
and world society, and the spread of a norm from local to global scale. Global 
environmentalism has its roots in late 19th century efforts by a small number of 
environmentalists, scientists and politicians to deal with the transboundary 
dimensions of nature conservation (Boardman, 1981: 26-30; Tyrell, 2015). 
Environmentalism itself is an amalgam of a wide range of ideas about the 
relationship between humans and their natural environment. Most of these 
originate from the beginning of the industrial revolution, though some can be 
traced back much further. They include Judeo-Christian ideas about nature as 
God’s creation that humans are commanded to exercise stewardship over 
(Kiser, 2003); organicist and animist thinking that challenges dominant 
anthropocentric worldviews (Nash, 1989: 20); and Romantic writings that 
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express a new environmental sensibility and defend nature’s intrinsic value 
and beauty against the ravages of industrialism (Nash, 2001: 49-50). 
Widespread deforestation in the 19th century gave rise to more utilitarian 
concerns about the economic costs of environmental degradation, while 
advances in the scientific study of nature brought out the interdependence of 
regional and global ecological systems (Worster, 1994: 265-8, 198-201). 
Thus, while the anti-modern reaction to industrialism was a central motif in 
early 19th century environmentalism – and continues to resonate today - the 
rise of ecology as a science, and growing concerns over the economic cost of 
environmental degradation, helped to put environmentalism on a more 
rationalist, modern, footing.  
 Over the course of the 19th century, these strands of environmental 
thinking gave rise to the conservation movement in North America and 
Europe. The first conservation groups (e.g. Sierra Club; Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds) were rooted in different national contexts, and it took 
some time for them to develop a global collective identity built around a 
cosmopolitan environmental solidarism. By the turn of the century, the 
conservation movement had created the first transnational networks, with 
environmental ideas and policies being debated at international scientific 
conferences and naturalist writings attracting a global readership. The 
conservation movement of the 19th century thus laid the foundation for a 
transnational network of non-state actors with the desire and capacity to 
engage the society of states in a project of international normative change. 
But to be successful internationally, environmentalists first had to establish 
nature conservation as a national policy in key countries. Only then could 
such policies be exported to other countries and to the international level. The 
conservation movement scored its first political success when the United 
States created a series of natural parks, starting with Yellowstone National 
Park in 1872, a policy later transferred to Europe, and eventually becoming 
the basis for protected areas policies around the world (Kupper, 2009). 
Environmentalism originated in world society, but its global spread depended 
on states as vehicles of policy change and international diffusion.  
 On at least three occasions during the early 20th century, 
environmentalists tried in vain to establish environmental responsibility on the 
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international agenda. Theodore Roosevelt provided American 
conservationists with the first opportunity to make nature protection a national 
and international policy priority. After convening the North American 
Conservation Conference in 1909, Roosevelt won agreement from leading 
European states to host a world conservation congress later that year. The 
conference was cancelled, however, when Roosevelt was succeeded in the 
White House by Taft, who shared none of his predecessor’s conservationist 
ideals (Tyrell, 2015: chapter 11). At around the same time, European 
scientists and conservationists lobbied their governments to convene an 
international environmental conference. The Swiss government eventually 
took up the idea and hosted 17 countries at a conference in Berne in 1913, 
which agreed to create a Consultative Commission for the International 
Protection of Nature. The outbreak of World War I prevented the Commission, 
the first-ever international environmental body, from taking up its work 
(Wöbse, 2012: 49-53). Environmentalists renewed their efforts after the war 
and lobbied for the League of Nations to be given an environmental mandate 
(Wöbse, 2012: 136-142). Yet again, these efforts ran into the ground. Despite 
the growing recognition that environmental degradation did not stop at 
national borders, leading states continued to view environmental problems as 
a domestic matter. Even in the aftermath of World War II, GIS did not accept a 
general responsibility for the global environment. The newly founded United 
Nations (UN) was not given an explicit mandate to deal with global 
environmental problems. Only UNESCO took on a limited role promoting 
scientific information exchange on environmental matters (Wöbse, 2012: 273-
78). 
 The turning point in the struggle to internationalise environmentalism 
came only when the ‘environmental revolution’ (Nicholson, 1972) of the 
1960s/70s transformed environmentalism from an elite concern into a mass 
movement. While earlier conservationist ideas appealed mainly to a narrow 
social and political elite (McCormick, 1989: 47), the dramatic expansion of 
economic prosperity after 1945 created the material conditions for a broader 
shift in societal perceptions of nature (McNeill, 2000: 336-7). Greater 
awareness of the environmental costs of industrial growth, combined with 
newly emerging post-material values, formed the basis for a grassroots-based 
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movement driven by a fear for human survival itself. When an estimated 20 
million US citizens attended the events marking the first Earth Day on 22 April 
1970, politicians across the political spectrum realised that environmentalism 
had become electorally significant (Shabecoff, 1993: chapter 5). It was this 
change in societal perceptions in advanced economies that provided political 
world society with the leverage it needed to get states to accept 
environmental stewardship as a solidarist international norm. 
 The modern environmental movement was also explicitly global in 
orientation. Unlike their conservationist predecessors, the new environmental 
organisations of the 1960s/70s were set up to operate transnationally, either 
as fundraising organisations (e.g. World Wildlife Fund, 1961) or global 
campaign networks (e.g. Friends of the Earth, 1969; Greenpeace, 1971) 
(Wapner, 1996). The globalisation of environmentalism also reflected the 
growing scientific and public awareness of planetary ecological 
interdependencies. While the beginning of planetary surveillance can be 
traced back to the system of telegraph and undersea cables established by 
the British Empire (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 82), twentieth century science 
made critical advances (e.g. satellites; space travel) that underlined the 
growing perception of a shrinking planet imperilled by modern technology. By 
the early 1970s, the environmental movement as part of political world society 
had successfully established the notion that humanity’s collective identity and 
interest in self-preservation demanded collective political action by states to 
stem the tide of environmental degradation.  
 The first time that this global environmental consciousness came to be 
reflected in the normative structure of GIS was at the Stockholm UN 
Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972, the key 
constitutional moment in the greening of GIS. The Stockholm Declaration, 
agreed by 113 countries, is the first international declaration to give 
expression to the environmental stewardship norm: ‘The protection and 
improvement of the human environment is […] the duty of all Governments’ 
(Preamble). In a nod to the conservation movement, the Declaration speaks 
of ‘a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of 
wildlife and its habitat’ (Principle 4). While this appears to make the non-
human environment a referent object of environmental stewardship, the 
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remainder of the Stockholm Declaration is predominantly framed in the 
anthropocentric context that defined the modern environmental movement: 
humans have a right ‘to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in 
an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being’ 
(Principle 1; see also Principles 2 and 3). The Stockholm Declaration also 
establishes specific responsibilities that concern state behaviour: preventing 
the pollution of the seas (Principle 7), integrating environmental 
considerations into development planning (Principle 13), preventing 
transnational environmental harm (Principle 21), and cooperating to develop 
international law on environmental liability and compensation (Principle 22) 
(United Nations: 3-5). 
 The emerging primary institution of environmental stewardship was not 
framed in isolation, however, and the Stockholm Declaration did not endorse 
the radical break with past state practice that some environmentalists had 
called for. Cosmopolitan solidarist notions of ‘Spaceship Earth’ and ‘common 
heritage of humanity’ had informed calls for a radical reorganization of the 
international order (e.g. Falk, 1971), and they were also influential in the 
preparatory meetings for the Stockholm conference (Ward and Dubos, 1972). 
By the time environmentalist ideas entered the realm of international 
diplomacy, however, it became clear that the majority of states had no 
intention of ceding regulatory authority to a new international environmental 
body representing the planetary interest. The Stockholm Declaration balances 
environmental duties with an unambiguous reassertion of the principles of 
national sovereignty and development (Principles 21 and 24). To become a 
viable new norm in international relations, environmental stewardship could 
not go against the normative grain of the established interstate order. 
 Despite these concessions, the new international environmental 
agenda of the 1970s was not met with global approval. Having boycotted the 
Stockholm Conference, most countries of the Soviet bloc ignored 
environmental concerns and took a backseat role in subsequent international 
negotiations. The biggest source of contention, and resistance, came from 
developing countries that considered the norm of environmental stewardship 
to be a neo-colonial plot that threatened the institution of development by 
adding costs that would prevent poorer countries from fully developing their 
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economies. The rival third world discourse focused on poverty and 
international justice, in contrast to the North’s focus on pollution prevention 
and population control (Hironaka, 2014: 38-9). Even though the UNCHE 
preparatory meetings had tried to bridge the differences between developed 
and developing countries (Bernstein, 2001; 32-42), deep North-South 
divisions plagued the 1972 summit and complicated subsequent efforts to 
implement its agenda.  
 It was not until the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio that developing country concerns moved centre 
stage in the international environmental agenda and environmental 
stewardship shed its Western origins to become global in scale. In the run-up 
to UNCED, the Brundtland Commission had elevated the notion of 
sustainable development to the status of a guiding principle in interpreting 
environmental stewardship (Bernstein, 2001: 58-69). Several key outcomes of 
the conference reinforced this shift towards a more explicit balancing of 
environment and development: the re-assertion in the Rio Declaration 
(Principle 2) of states’ sovereign right to exploit their natural resources and 
determine their environmental policies; and the strengthened emphasis on 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, both in the Rio Declaration 
(Principle 7) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC, Article 3.1). Differentiation in responsibilities did not alter states’ 
fundamental commitment to environmental stewardship as such, but affected 
the way they were expected to contribute to collective environmental efforts. 
Nearly all international environmental regimes created after 1992 included 
provisions for international environmental aid, as a means of both achieving 
environmental goals and assisting sustainable development in the Global 
South. Cosmopolitan environmental solidarism was now more firmly 
embedded in a larger state-centric solidarist structure that sought to balance 
environmental stewardship with national sovereignty, development, and inter-
state justice. In the absence of an imminent ecological crisis, the greening of 
international society was forced into what Spandler (2015) calls a path-
dependent form of incremental normative change. 
 By the end of the 20th century, environmental stewardship had become 
clearly identifiable as an emerging primary institution of international society. 
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As was evident at UNCED, nearly all states had by then accepted the need to 
participate and develop the multilateral institutional infrastructure to discharge 
their duties as environmentally responsible members of GIS, even if 
environmental norms were still honoured more in the breach than the 
observance. But despite the near-universal acceptance of environmental 
stewardship, differences persisted with regard to how environmental 
principles were interpreted, and how they resonated domestically. The 
environmental stewardship norm had successfully transcended both its 
cosmopolitan and Western origins, and the earlier North-versus-South political 
dynamics, to become global in scale, encompassing the normative demands 
of both developed and developing countries. In this sense, the rise of global 
environmentalism is part of the story of the emergence of a global 
international society after the era of decolonisation.  
 The emergence of the solidarist primary institution of environmental 
stewardship provides a striking example of progressive normative 
development in interstate society that originated in world society. International 
society is a porous entity that not only derives its core norms from an internal 
logic of system maintenance but also adopts and institutionalises norms that 
norm entrepreneurs in political world society have created and promoted 
(Clark, 2007). UNCHE was one of those points of negotiation between world 
society and interstate society that have reshaped the principles of 
international legitimacy. It provided a window of opportunity for 
environmentalists, operating in global civil society and within governments, to 
insert environmental stewardship into the normative fabric of GIS. However, 
the process of environmental norm transfer was not a straightforward process. 
By raising ecological awareness and making the environment a politically 
salient issue in domestic politics, the environmental movement prepared the 
ideational ground, but it was the agency of powerful states that ensured 
environmentalism’s emergence and strengthening within the constitutional 
order of GIS. The expansion of the state’s domestic responsibility for the 
environment, first in the United States and other leading industrialised 
economies, played a critical role in making the norm transfer a success. State 
power and agency – initially by the United States and later by European 
countries (DeSombre, 2000; Kelemen and Vogel, 2010) – played a decisive 
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role in establishing environmental stewardship as a primary institution. 
Environmental stewardship thus belongs in the group of primary institutions of 
GIS, along with human equality, the market, and nationalism, that would not 
have come into being without both world society actors and states promoting 
them. In the process, the cosmopolitan solidarist vision was channelled into a 
state-centric solidarist form of global environmentalism. 
 
The Creation of Secondary Institutions Around the Norm of 
Environmental Stewardship  
 
In this section, we focus on the growth in secondary institutions – treaties and 
organizations deliberately created to deal with specific environmental 
problems. As noted, secondary institutions reflect and reproduce primary 
institutions; socialize states into the norms and practices of international 
society; and are forums for political contestation and conflict. As such, they 
are critical indicators of normative development in GIS.  
 The 1972 Stockholm Conference, was not only critical in the 
emergence of environmental norms, but also in the creation of environmental 
secondary institutions. The few international treaties that had been created 
before 1972 dealt with a limited range of transboundary environmental 
problems (e.g. 1902 Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to 
Agriculture; 1911 North Pacific Fur Seal Convention) (Boardman, 1981: 26-9). 
None of these treaties constituted a systematic attempt at creating global 
environmental policy, and no international body was created to oversee global 
environmental protection. By contrast, after Stockholm GIS set out to create 
an increasingly dense web of global environmental organizations (UN 
Environment Programme; UN Commission on Sustainable Development; 
Global Environment Facility) and treaties, with over 500 multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) having been negotiated to date. 3 The 
emergence of this institutional architecture for global environmental protection 
represents one of the fastest and most comprehensive expansions of state-
centric solidarism in international policy-making. 																																																								
3 The International Environmental Agreements Database lists 530 multilateral 
agreements for the period from 1800 to 2016: http://iea.uoregon.edu.  
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 A measure of the growing recognition for the environmental 
stewardship norm can be found in secondary institutions’ expanding coverage 
of environmental issues, from early efforts to internationalize conservation 
policies (e.g. 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
– CITES) and limit specific forms of environmental harm (1972 London 
Convention on Dumping at Sea) to treaties with a regional and increasingly 
global focus on protecting entire ecosystems (1985 Vienna Convention on 
ozone layer depletion; 1992 UNFCCC; 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity). GIS also succeeded in drawing a growing number of countries into 
secondary institutions. Most environmental treaties of the pre-Stockholm era 
and in the 1970s were negotiated by only a small number of countries, mostly 
from the OECD. From the 1980s, however, more and more developing 
countries started to engage in multilateral environmental processes, pushing 
towards near-universal participation. Whereas only 24 countries attended the 
first UNEP workshop on ozone layer depletion in 1982, 43 countries 
negotiated the 1985 Vienna Convention, and over 60 countries, half from the 
developing world, the 1987 Montreal Protocol (Benedick, 1991: 42, 44 and 
74). Many more developing countries were engaged in the UNFCCC 
preparatory meetings and the treaty was signed by 154 countries in 1992.  
 International environmental policy has also witnessed an unusually 
high degree of participation by scientists, environmental campaigners and 
corporate actors, as providers of policy-relevant knowledge, norm 
entrepreneurs and lobbyists (Betsill and Correll, 2008; Falkner, 2008; Haas, 
1995). This reflects both a strengthening of the role that organized advocacy 
plays as a ‘legitimate expression of public opinion’ (Buzan, 2018) and a 
functional need to involve a wide range of societal actors at multiple levels 
(Zürn, 2004: 268). As a consequence, intergovernmental environmental 
processes tend to be more porous and accessible than most other such 
processes (e.g. trade, finance, security). The growing enmeshment of state 
and nonstate actors has had a complex effect on the growth of solidarist 
environmental governance. On the one hand, environmental campaigning by 
NGOs has become a major demand factor behind the supply of state-centric 
international regulation. In this sense, world society engagement in 
environmental multilateralism has legitimated the state’s and international 
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society’s role as a provider of environmental governance. In short, it has 
boosted state-centric environmental solidarism. On the other hand, persistent 
weaknesses in national and international environmental policy have led many 
campaigners to question and challenge the ecological effectiveness and 
legitimacy of state-centric solutions. Increasingly, world society actors have 
pushed for global solutions based on political, social and economic processes 
that transcend state-centric policy-making (Wapner, 1996). In this sense, the 
global environmental movement has become part of a bigger transnational 
effort to expand environmental governance beyond the narrow confines of 
interstate society (Hurrell, 2007: 227-8), weaving state and nonstate actors 
into complex transnational networks that pursue a more cosmopolitan 
solidarist agenda. 
 Secondary institutions reflect important characteristics of underlying 
primary institutions, and the normative influence of the environmental 
stewardship norm on MEAs can be seen in a number of ways. For one, post-
1972 environmental treaties have followed an increasingly anthropocentric 
notion of environmentalism: speaking in a cosmopolitan solidarist way on 
behalf of humankind as a whole by prioritising a clean environment, and 
balancing nature protection with economic development and growth. Some 
environmental treaties of the 1970s still expressed a narrowly defined 
conservationist agenda (CITES, 1973; Convention on Migratory Species, 
1979), but the majority of environmental regimes created thereafter 
emphasized the need to protect ecosystems mainly because of the value they 
hold to human society and human health (e.g. ozone regime; climate change 
regime). Especially since the adoption of sustainable development as a 
central guiding principle at UNCED, developing countries successfully pushed 
for environmental protection to be connected with wider developmental 
agendas. The resulting dominance of anthropocentric understandings of 
nature has served to marginalise the more radical strands of the 
environmental movement on the diplomatic stage (Ford, 2003).  
 Environmental secondary institutions also reflect states’ pluralist 
insistence that international environmental regulation should not infringe on 
their sovereign rights. GIS has largely steered clear of environmentalists’ 
demands to strengthen international regulatory authority, and MEAs mostly 
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leave the implementation of international agreements and reporting on 
domestic policies to the sovereign authority of member states (Bodansky, 
2010: chapter 10). On the whole, MEAs rely on facilitative, non-punitive, 
compliance mechanisms, offering assistance to those countries that are non-
compliant with international obligations (Faure and Lefevere, 2010). Unlike the 
WTO system, environmental treaties do not have a centralized dispute 
settlement mechanism that can issue legally binding rulings with the 
possibility of sanctioning noncompliant states.  
 As the equity dimension in the primary institution of environmental 
stewardship gained in importance between Stockholm and Rio, it reflected the 
still spatially uneven distribution of the environmental stewardship norm. 
MEAs created in the 1980s and 1990s began to include increasingly strong 
forms of differentiation between developed and developing countries, when it 
comes to the responsibilities, rights and duties of parties and the use of 
international aid mechanisms. For example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol and 
the 1989 Basel Convention gave developing countries a grace period to meet 
key treaty obligations and provided them with financial and technological 
assistance. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol went further by establishing a more 
radical interpretation of the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’, exempting developing countries altogether from the 
requirement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Rajamani, 2012: 611). 
  While the rapid growth in secondary institutions provides a measure of 
the growing salience of environmental stewardship as a primary institution, 
the evolution of environmental policy-making also suggests important 
limitations to the state-centric solidarist direction that the greening of GIS has 
taken. It has not been possible to create a more integrated and legalized 
system of global environmental governance, particularly when compared to 
the WTO trade system. The task of global environmental protection is 
distributed among a large number of institutions, many of which are only 
loosely connected to each other. UNEP, created in 1973 with the purpose of 
facilitating and coordinating environmental protection efforts across the UN, 
has only partially fulfilled this integrative role (Bauer, 2013). Institutional 
fragmentation may reflect the diverse nature of global environmental 
problems, but given the limited powers and financial resources that are at the 
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disposal of environmental bodies, institutional competition and conflict can act 
as a barrier to more effective environmental governance (Biermann et al., 
2009).  
 Furthermore, the drive to strengthen global environmental governance 
by expanding multilateral rule-making has slowed down and is giving way to a 
creeping sense of ‘treaty fatigue’ (Bauer, 2013: 325). Enhancing global 
environmental protection through international legalization has proved to be 
futile, and with international support for multilateralism in decline, the push for 
reforming and strengthening international environmental organizations has 
failed to yield meaningful results (Bernstein, 2013). After the high-water mark 
of global environmentalism in the 1990s, there has also been growing 
contestation of key aspects of the global governance structure for 
environmental protection, not only by developing countries but also by 
developed countries that had previously championed the environmental 
stewardship norm. This is most clearly evident in the field of climate politics, 
where the United States challenged the Kyoto Protocol’s interpretation of the 
equity norm of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (Hurrell and 
Sengupta, 2012). Although the US could not prevent the Kyoto Protocol from 
entering into force in 2005, its opposition to the uneven mitigation burden – in 
addition to the growing emissions profile of emerging economies – played a 
key role in the transition from Kyoto-style emissions rules to a de-centralized 
system of voluntary pledges in the 2015 Paris Agreement (Falkner, 2016). 
Just as the responsibility to act against global warming has been accepted by 
more and more states, contestation over the nature of the regulatory regime 
has limited the consolidation of the environmental stewardship norm into a 
strongly solidarist primary institution based on internationally agreed and 
legally binding environmental obligations. Paris signifies both the success in 
universalising environmental stewardship and the barriers to its strengthening 
and deepening within the normative structure of GIS. 
 
Environmental Stewardship and State Behaviour/Identity  
 
As environmentalism strengthens as a global primary institution, we ought to 
see corresponding changes in GIS at different levels. At the state level, we 
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would expect to see states creating domestic environmental agencies, 
adopting environmental policies and integrating environmental objectives into 
other areas of policy-making (‘mainstreaming’), in line with their recognition of 
a global environmental responsibility. These changes should manifest 
themselves first as behavioural change, which has already attracted 
considerable scholarly attention (Busch and Jörgens, 2005; Holzinger, Knill 
and Sommerer, 2008; Roberts, Parks and Vásquez, 2004). But to qualify as a 
primary institution, we would also expect environmentalism to have a 
constitutive effect on states, with consequences for states’ identity, and 
mutually shared understanding of international legitimacy (Clark, 2005: 5). 
This dimension has received far less attention in the literature, though recent 
work on the rise of the ‘green state’ points in this direction (Eckersley, 2004; 
Meadowcroft, 2005). This section considers the extent to which the rise of 
global environmental stewardship can be traced in both behavioural and 
constitutive effects on states and interstate relations. 
 The Stockholm Conference’s most discernible effect on state practices 
around the world can be found in the global spread of environmental policies 
and institutions, first among industrialised countries and later also in the 
developing world. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (created 1970) 
served as an early model for countries that sought to establish their own 
national environmental agencies. The increase in domestic environmental 
institutions after Stockholm is best understood as a policy diffusion process 
(Busch and Jörgens, 2005: 872-6), based on international harmonization and 
transnational communication (Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer, 2008), and with 
major international conferences and initiatives serving as important external 
stimuli (Haas, 2002). UNCED in 1992 produced a further push to embed 
environmental policies worldwide, while the EU’s Fifth Environmental Action 
Plan of 1992 became an important reference point in the diffusion of 
environmental policy practices particularly to Central and Eastern European 
countries (Busch and Jörgens, 2005: 868-870). At the same time, the OECD 
and the World Bank provided blueprints for the global spread of environmental 
policy models, increasingly reaching into developing countries as well. By the 
time the UN General Assembly in 1997 called on all UN members to complete 
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the creation of sustainable development strategies, 4  150 countries had 
already established national commissions or coordinating mechanisms to 
develop an integrated approach to sustainable development. National 
environmental policy had thus become a routine governmental responsibility 
by the end of the 20th century, with only the poorest countries lacking 
adequate administrative capacity. 
 The strengthening of the environmental stewardship norm can also be 
seen in states’ growing engagement with an expanding international 
environmental agenda. States had little choice but to develop a dedicated 
diplomatic and legal infrastructure for participating in international 
environmental negotiations and translating international agreements into 
domestic law. Initially, only a small group of leading industrialised countries 
systematically pursued environmental diplomacy. By the 1990s, the 
commitment to address global environmental problems through multilateral 
negotiation and rule-making, had become rooted in both diplomatic practice 
and mutually shared understandings of legitimate membership in GIS.  
 The strength of the normative commitment to environmental 
multilateralism varies across countries and regions. While the European 
Union has established a constitutional commitment to developing international 
responses to environmental problems, 5  other major powers did so only 
implicitly. Furthermore, not all states that routinely participate in multilateral 
negotiations necessarily support the environmental objectives behind them, 
and some resist specific regulatory instruments or refuse to ratify multilaterally 
agreed treaties. Environmental multilateralism is, therefore, more a procedural 
than a substantive norm. It creates an expectation that states must participate 
in multilateral environmental processes if they wish to be considered as 
legitimate members of GIS. As the history of international environmental 
politics shows, virtually all states, including the most powerful ones, have 
found it difficult to extricate themselves from this procedural expectation, and 
																																																								
4 UNGA Resolution A/RES/S-19/2 Programme for the Further Implementation of 
Agenda 21, 28 June 1997, point 11, at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/spec/aress19-2.htm. 
5 Lisbon Treaty, Art. 21(1) and 21(2)(f).  
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no major power has as yet abandoned the commitment to negotiating 
environmental protection in multilateral settings.   
 The strength of the environmental multilateralism norm can be seen in 
the case of those major powers that are often considered to be laggards in 
key global environmental areas. Despite championing the global 
environmental agenda in the 1970s, the US has opposed the creation of 
several recent international environmental treaties, thereby ceding the mantle 
of leadership to the EU (Keleman and Vogel, 2010). But despite their failure to 
ratify important new multilateral environmental treaties, successive US 
administrations nevertheless continued to engage in the multilateral process. 
Even at the height of American unilateralism under President George W. 
Bush, the US never fully abandoned the UNFCCC process. Under the Obama 
administration, the US returned to the multilateral fold and became a key 
architect of the new bottom-up logic of the Paris Agreement (Falkner, 2016). 
The election of Trump, who has withdrawn the US from the Paris Agreement 
while promising to remain engaged in the climate negotiations, provides the 
toughest test yet for the climate regime. However, the strong international 
opprobrium that Trump has caused suggests that the environmental 
multilateralism norm has so far withstood America’s unilateral challenge. The 
strength of domestic US support for the Paris climate accord shows that the 
domestic resonance of global environmentalism runs much deeper than the 
vagaries of federal climate policy (Bomberg, 2017).  
 China, for example, has also felt the pull factor of the environmental 
multilateralism norm, increasingly engaging in the global environmental 
agenda despite the country’s long-standing resistance to international 
environmental regulations that might impinge on its domestic policy 
autonomy. In part, that turn results from the rising priority of environmental 
stewardship in China’s domestic politics. Internationally, the turning point 
came in 2006 when China overtook the US to become the world’s biggest 
emitter of carbon dioxide. Ever since, world leaders have urged the country to 
make a stronger contribution to the global mitigation effort, with President 
Obama making an explicit link between China’s great power status and 
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climate responsibility.6 For China as well as for other emerging powers, the 
environmental stewardship norm thus creates both expectations of 
‘responsible behaviour’ that they find increasingly hard to ignore, and also 
opportunities to align domestic priorities with global ones that are increasingly 
attractive to burnishing their international image (Zhang, 2016: 812, 814-5). 
For China, the fact that environmental stewardship is not a liberal norm, but 
one arising from shared fates, offers it the opportunity to offset some of the 
damage to its image done by its rejection of democracy and liberal human 
rights. Environmental stewardship links well to China’s preference for a state-
led developmental and survival view of human rights which it shares with 
many other illiberal states (Kozyrev, 2016: 812, 814-5).  
 It is important to note that the growing entrenchment of the 
environmental multilateralism norm is clearest in relation to its procedural core 
that all accept the obligation to participate. The substantive side of the norm is 
more complex. Despite the growing acknowledgement by all major powers of 
their special responsibilities in the climate field, some of the most powerful 
states have successfully contested the expectations that grew around the 
norm of ‘common but differential responsibilities’ as expressed in the Kyoto 
Protocol. The recent move in the climate regime to a more balanced and 
voluntary definition of responsibilities provides an example of both the 
strengthening of the general notion of great power responsibility for 
environmental protection and a weakening of the core regulatory regime 
(Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012). Even though the regulatory obligations have 
been softened for developed states, the substantive norm has been 
strengthened in the Paris Agreement in the sense that voluntary emission 
targets now apply to all (Falkner, 2016). Everyone now accepts that they have 
not only to participate in environmental negotiations, but also take 
responsibility for acting to mitigate environmental harm. 
 In sum, the widely observable greening of state practice in GIS 
supports our argument that environmental stewardship has emerged and 
strengthened as a primary institution of GIS. At the same time, it is clear we 																																																								
6 Remarks by the President at U.N. Climate Change Summit, United Nations 




have not witnessed a deeper structural transformation of GIS’s normative 
structure that comes close to what might be described as a transformation of 
the nation-state’s core purpose and identity into a ‘green state’ (Eckersley, 
2004). While the rise of environmentalism has opened up the possibility of the 
moral purpose of the state changing to include a wider range of objectives 
including environmental guardianship (Reus-Smit, 1996), we are still far from 
nation-states being reconstituted as ‘local agents of the common good’ (Bull, 
1984) or guardians of the planet’s ecological health. Environmentalism has 
entered the normative structure of international relations as a new primary 
institution but remains challenged by other, more established, primary 
institutions (sovereignty, development, market, great power management) and 
systemic pressures on states that make the greening of international 
legitimacy an incomplete process. The bigger ambitions of cosmopolitan 
environmental solidarists have been restrained by their translation into state-
centric solidarism.  
 
Environmental Stewardship and Other Primary Institutions 
 
We have argued that environmental stewardship has successfully emerged as 
a new primary institution of GIS. It has moved from being a concern mainly of 
Western civil society, and then Western states, to being a globally accepted 
solidarist institution in which a majority of states of all types acknowledge both 
the problem and their responsibility to act. While core regulatory regimes have 
softened away from mandatory targets, the acceptance of responsibility to act 
has widened, with the idea of ‘common responsibilities’ gaining ground over 
‘differentiated’. This evolution justifies placing environmental stewardship as a 
newly arrived, and still evolving, primary institution of GIS. For a value to 
qualify as a primary institution depends less on the depth with which it is held, 
and more on the extent to which there is a universally shared view of it. The 
question is whether the depth of the value will increase now that it is 
universally accepted. 
 This growing universal acceptance, even if still somewhat shallow, also 
differentiates environmental stewardship from other candidates for primary 
institution status. Democracy and human rights, seen by liberals as emerging 
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primary institutions of GIS, are in fact hotly contested among states, and so 
are better seen as subglobal institutions of Western international society, 
where they are widely, and often deeply, held. Given their entanglement with 
liberal ideology, this contested status seems likely to endure as the world 
divides between democracies and authoritarians. Environmental stewardship 
does not get caught up in this ideological division because it is not a liberal 
value. Its logic arises from a shared fate/threat that transcends liberal versus 
authoritarian concerns. This is not to say that environmental stewardship is 
uncontested. But the controversies around it are now more within states than 
between them. 
 Given the existential logic that underlies it, environmental stewardship 
has the potential to transform GIS by changing the core moral purpose of both 
states and GIS. An analogy might be the wholesale transformation created by 
the rise of sovereignty and territoriality that pushed European international 
society from mediaeval to modern form (Ruggie, 1983, 1993). Such a 
transformation clearly has not occurred, and does not seem to be in prospect. 
Instead, environmental stewardship is taking its place alongside, and in 
interaction with, the other primary institutions that define GIS. This makes it 
more comparable with nationalism, which as Mayall (1990; 2000: 62-3) notes, 
integrated with, and in some ways disrupted, the existing set of primary 
institutions, changing their meaning and the practices associated with them. 
The rise of the market in the 20th century also had this disruptive quality. What 
does environmental stewardship look like in this framing? 
 How environmental stewardship relates to other primary institutions 
depends on how it is formulated, and as noted in section 2, there are two 
views about this, one deeply ideological, the other strongly pragmatic. The 
ideological view is that it mainly concerns the protection of the non-human 
environment for its own sake, thereby expanding international society’s moral 
landscape beyond the standard anthropocentric perspective into the natural 
world.7 The pragmatic view is that it is mainly an anthropocentric solidarist 
value concerned with sustaining a liveable planet for humankind and therefore 
linkable to human rights/human security. In the ideological view, humankind 																																																								




and the existing GIS are cast more as threats than as referent objects; in the 
pragmatic view, the essential referent object of environmental stewardship is 
human civilization. While the ideological view is certainly out there in the 
environmental movement (Scarce, 2016), it is mainly the pragmatic one that 
drives environmental stewardship within GIS.  
 It would require another paper to work through in detail the impact of 
environmental stewardship on the whole institutional structure of GIS, but 
even at this early stage, the general shape of its impact is becoming clear. 
Environmental stewardship is a smooth fit with diplomacy, international law, 
human equality and human rights. With diplomacy, it has opened up a new 
agenda, underpinned the creation of new secondary institutions, and pushed 
states to create the necessary foreign policy tools to deal with this. With 
international law, it has opened up a new functional area for development. 
With human equality and human rights, the pragmatic reading of 
environmental stewardship provides an additional standard by which these 
can be measured. Although environmental stewardship has emerged 
separately from human rights, there are strong synergies between them. For 
some other primary institutions, the rise of environmental stewardship has so 
far had little consequence. This is true for nationalism, which might be, but so 
far has not been, threatened by the cosmopolitan quality of environmental 
stewardship that emphasizes that all human beings are sitting in the same 
boat. It is also true for balance of power, which is anyway currently at a 
relatively low ebb compared to its past role. 
 But for several other primary institutions, environmental stewardship 
has begun to have impacts, some of which could grow. Environmental 
stewardship, like the market, puts pressure even on what are arguably the two 
foundational institutions of GIS: sovereignty and territoriality. Strong 
interpretations of sovereignty and territoriality become problematic because 
both the market and environmental stewardship require a global system 
perspective and coordinated rules of the game that transcend borders. 
Environmental stewardship might eventually require deeper levels of solidarist 
cooperation and institution-building than mere policy coordination. States 
cannot defend impermeable borders or arbitrary rights to change the rules if 
they want to be part of a global market, and neither can they if they want to 
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pursue global environmental stewardship. Environmental stewardship also 
contains the same potential as human rights for bringing the important 
corollary of sovereignty and territoriality, the right of non-intervention, into 
question. Although still contested, the idea that gross violations of human 
rights can constitute a cause for intervention, might also become an issue with 
environmental stewardship. As the norm of responsibility for the environment 
strengthens, it becomes less difficult to imagine calls for intervention against 
states committing gross acts of environmental abuse. 
 Environmental stewardship also impacts on two other traditional 
institutions: war and great power management (GPM). In relation to war, it 
adds environmental harm to the array of constraints that have narrowed the 
legitimate uses and methods of war since the 19th century. In relation to GPM, 
it has reinforced this institution by adding environmental stewardship to the 
agenda of responsible great power behaviour. At the same time, it is helping 
to change the meaning of GPM by pushing it to merge with global 
governance. As Cui and Buzan (2016) argue, the expansion of the 
international security agenda from traditional military concerns to the wider 
agenda of non-traditional security issues, has created increasing overlap 
between the agenda and the actors of GPM, and the agenda and actors of 
global governance. Environmental stewardship has strong roots in both global 
governance’s engagement of civil society actors, and GPM’s responsibility for 
environmental security. 
 The rise of environmental stewardship also impacts on two of the 
newer institutions, development and the market. In relation to development, it 
puts pressure on how this institution is understood. To the extent that 
development is simply defined as economic growth with a reasonably wide 
distribution of the benefits, it potentially falls into contradiction with 
environmental stewardship. To avoid this contradiction, ‘development’ has 
moved towards ‘sustainable development’ (Sachs, 2012). In relation to the 
market, environmental stewardship provides both a new set of opportunities, 
in terms of production, trade and aid aimed at providing environmentally 
sustainable goods and services; and new restraints that impose obligations on 
the market to reduce environmental harm. 
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 Environmental stewardship thus has some of the disruptive qualities 
that attended the rise of nationalism and the market. Like them, it puts 
pressure on various other primary institutions, not in a zero-sum way, but in 
terms of changing the meanings and practices associated with them. The 
impact of environmental stewardship on development might come to be seen 
as a positive change in its own right. Environmental stewardship shares with 
the market a seeming cosmopolitanising tendency, which might be seen as 
threatening to not only nationalism, but to GIS as a whole. But both have 
proved amenable to state-centric solidarism, which strengthens GIS rather 
than undermining it. The difference between them is that environmental 





We have shown that the ES-based analytical framework set out in section 2 
can deliver a detailed assessment in both normative and institutional terms, of 
the rise of environmental stewardship as a new primary institution of GIS. This 
framework offers a more systematic approach to the empirical analysis of the 
normative structure of GIS. Our case study has shown that environmental 
stewardship has definitely ‘arrived’ as a solidarist primary institution. Its rise to 
being a consensual norm of GIS can be clearly tracked through the actions of 
both world and interstate society, as can the creation of supporting secondary 
institutions; the constitutive changes in member states, both organisational 
and normative; and the impact of the new norm on existing primary 
institutions.  
 Primary institutions are constitutive of both states and GIS. In these 
terms, environmental stewardship has had a noticeable, but not redefining, 
impact on the criteria for rightful membership of GIS. States feel considerable 
pressure to follow the procedural norm of environmental stewardship, but the 
norm is not (yet) strong enough to threaten any state with either expulsion 
from GIS or status demotion within the hierarchy of GIS. It has made a 
significant, and seemingly growing, impact on the basic character of states 
inasmuch as there is convergence on the idea that states have not only a 
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moral responsibility to manage the planetary environment, but also a practical 
one to take measures to implement that responsibility, and to equip 
themselves for participating in GIS to that end. It is a strong enough institution 
to have generated an observable two-way interaction between the normative 
development of environmentalism within states and within GIS.  
 As a case study, environmental stewardship adds to the arguments set 
out by Clark (2007) about the ways in which actors and ideas from world 
society can and do shape the normative agenda and structure of the society 
of states. Environmental stewardship is not just a new institution in its own 
right, but also one that is making significant changes to the understanding and 
practice of other primary institutions, so far most notably development and 
great power management.  
 In relation to Wendt’s (1999) criteria for how any social structure is held 
in place - by coercion, by calculation or by belief –environmental stewardship 
looks like a fairly strong institution, mostly resting on belief. Like the market, 
part of its support is also calculation, but like nationalism it requires relatively 
little coercion. Since belief is most likely to provide durable foundations for an 
institution, environmental stewardship looks to be stable in itself, and also a 
general contribution to the strength of GIS.  
 The emergence of environmental stewardship can perhaps be seen as 
part of a wider shift in GIS away from the classical concerns of war, balance 
of power, and the ability (or not) of the great powers to order relations 
amongst themselves (Bull, 1977), towards an expanding agenda of shared 
fate issues such as weapons of mass destruction, transnational terrorism, 
cybersecurity, migration, and the management of the global economy (Cui 
and Buzan, 2016). GIS is becoming deeply pluralist in the sense of a wider 
distribution of wealth and power among states, more sources of legitimate 
cultural authority, and durable differences between democratic and 
authoritarian approaches to politics. That trend suggests a weakening of GIS 
as the dominance and leadership of the West declines, and its ability (and 
willingness) to support the myth of liberal universal values decreases. But 
pluralism is about coexistence, and the success of environmental stewardship 
suggests that the need to deal with shared fate issues could support a 
significant degree of functionally specific, and mainly state-centric, solidarism, 
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sufficient to override political and cultural differences. In the emerging world of 
decentred globalism, the rise of environmental stewardship is a sign that 
responsible great power behaviour along functional lines is possible when 
shared-fate concerns are strong enough to override the political fault lines of 
GIS, most obviously those between developed and developing countries and 
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